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1. Introduction
[W]henever they [the Bosnian Serb soldier] spot a male person… they would take him
away and the person would not be seen after that… Every time they came to take a man
away, afterwards you would hear screams of the family, of the wife, daughters, and from
the direction of the houses where the men were being taken to, I couldn't tell you exactly,
of course, what was happening there, but from that direction we could hear screams
which looked like something from a horror movie
So they [the Bosniak men] were taken towards the buses one by one… this was one of
the saddest moments that I ever had in that area, in that you could see men, real men,
crying, asking us, "You, UNPROFOR, why are you letting these people take us? Why
are you letting them go with us? Why do you want us to be killed by these people?" And
we could ask them, you know, "What do you think they're going to do to you," and they
say, "Really, these people are going to kill us."
And of course, everywhere in the world, when Srebrenica is discussed, it’s seen as
genocide…The reconciliation process cannot truly start without [the perpetrators]
admitting it.
Acknowledging the truth about Srebrenica is a must and indispensable to all sides. Part of
that truth is that despite the pain, despite the suffering… those acts were not done with
the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Bosnian Muslims as a group. The truth is
that General Radislav Krstić is not guilty of genocide or complicity in genocide.1
These quotes come from the documentary from which this project draws its name:
“Srebrenica Genocide: No Room for Denial,” produced by the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The ICTY was founded by the United Nations in 1993, after
the UN’s Commission of Experts found evidence that forces involved in the Croatian and
Bosnian Wars had breached international humanitarian laws.2 The first two quotes come from
witnesses before the courts – a Bosniak woman and an UNPROFOR soldier; the third, from a
survivor of the genocide; and the last, from the defense in the trial of Radislav Krstić. Although
the documentary title itself states that the facts established by the Tribunal regarding Srebrenica

1

“Srebrenica Genocide: No Room for Denial,” United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, last modified January 3, 2018, https://youtu.be/Sq77TySTst0
2
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cannot be disputed, the reality of the situation is that narratives of denial are pervasive in Bosnia,
including in the ICTY’s courtroom. But why is that, and how do unofficial narratives interact
with the ICTY’s official narrative?
After Josef Tito died, the collapse of communism and an uptick in nationalism created
the perfect storm for Yugoslavia. The period of relative peace gave way to political and
economic crisis that culminated in Slovenia and Croatia declaring independence on the same day
in 1991. On March 3, 1992, Bosnia declared its own independence following a referendum
boycotted by Bosnian Serbs, and about a month later, it was recognized as a sovereign nation
internationally.3 Around the same time, Bosnian Serbs declared independence from Bosnia, and
in alignment with an agreement made in 1991 between the presidents of Serbia and Croatia,
Bosnian Serbs with support from Serbia and Bosnian Croats with support from Croatia began
seizing territory for their respective ethnic homelands.4 The fighting reached eastern Bosnia,
where Srebrenica is located, by June 1992, causing tens of thousands of Bosniaks to shelter in
the town of Srebrenica, which was subsequently declared a safe zone by the UN, who sent troops
to protect it.5
Life in Srebrenica was bleak, and made bleaker by Directive 7, issued in early 1995 by
the president of the Bosnian Serb administration and the general of the Bosnian Serb Army
(VRS), which set the goal of making life in the enclave “unbearable”. On July 6, 1995, the VRS
took the town of Srebrenica, at which point the refugees fled to the UN base at Potočari, which
was overrun only a few days later, on July 11. That night, a group of Bosniak men tried to escape
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“The Conflicts,” United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, accessed March 30,
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“ICTY Remembers: The Srebrenica Genocide, 1995-2015,” United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for
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by marching to Bosniak-held territory further west. The VRS began to separate women and
children from men; the men were taken to detention sites and the women and children were
forcibly removed by busses to Bosniak territory. On July 13, the VRS embarked on mass killings
of the Bosniak men who stayed behind, all the while shelling the column and taking prisoners,
who were then also executed.6 Over the course of the war, all three ethnic groups became both
victims and perpetrators of war crimes.7 The war ended with a ceasefire followed by the signing
of the Dayton Peace Accords until intense international pressure from the US and NATO.8 It is
important to note that the war did not end because of a military victory, so while ending the
fighting probably saved many lives, it did complicate reconciliation, because there was no true
victor.
In this paper, I use narratives of affirmation and denial surrounding the genocide at
Srebrenica to argue that historical memory is being used as a tool to promote ethnonationalism in
Bosnia. This ethnonationalism is not without consequence, as it promotes a narrow,
uncomplicated view of history, and one that perpetuates existing tensions. I will begin by
discussing the historical context as it relates to the rise of ethnonationalism and establishing the
official narrative as set forth by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. I
will then analyze how the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Center, created by the Bosniaks,
confirms and engages with the ICTY’s narrative, before exploring some of the ways in which
Bosnian Serbs participate in perpetuating narratives that deny the genocide. According to Sanja
Kutnjak Ivković and John Hagan, the brand of ethnonationalism present in the former
Yugoslavia today relies on positioning one’s own ethnic group as a victim rather than a
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perpetrator.9 In the case of Srebrenica, for Bosnian Serbs, accepting the ICTY’s findings – that
the Bosnian Serb Army was guilty of committing genocide – would directly contradict that
narrative, and thus the major narratives of denial of Srebrenica come from ethnic Serbs. For
Bosniaks, however, engaging in narratives of commemoration or affirmation of the ICTY’s
findings at Srebrenica serves as a way of justifying their ethnonationalism.
In her book Memorial Mania, Erika Doss characterizes the frenzy to erect monuments in
the United States following World War II as “an obsession with issues of memory and history
and an urgent desire to express and claim those issues in visibly public contexts.” She identifies
five primary emotions that relate to the “affective conditions” of today’s America as is
manifested in this memorial mania: grief, gratitude, fear, shame, and anger.10 While Doss was
referring specifically to the United States, her writings are relevant when applied to the situation
in Bosnia today. In Bosnia, there is a void where a common historical narrative should be.
Because the Dayton Accords ended the war with essentially a draw, there is a sense of a lack of
resolution regarding the war and the ethnonationalist tensions that sparked it. These tensions
have been allowed to fester, with one of the results being competing historical narratives
regarding the war. Because of this, conflicting historical narratives have arisen, and
memorialization of the same event can take on multiple of the emotions that Doss discusses,
depending on who is doing the memorializing. The narratives of affirmation tend to fit in with
memorials related to fear, while the narratives of denial tend to fit in with memorialization of
anger. Although the types of affect present in these narratives overlaps with those that Doss
discusses, this analysis is not restricted to physical memorials in the way that Doss’s is; rather, it

9

Sanja Kutnjak Ivković and John Hagan, “The Legitimacy of International Courts: Victims’ Evaluation of the ICTY
and Local Courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” European Journal of Criminology 14, no. 2 (2016): 206.
10
Erika Doss, Memorial Mania (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 2.
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explores how the different narratives manifest themselves in many aspects of life in Bosnia, from
graffiti to political speeches.

2. Historical Background
Despite today’s ethnonationalist tensions, the Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats (the three
major ethnic groups in Bosnia) share common origins. All three groups are descended from the
same group of Slavs, who migrated to the Balkan Peninsula before the 7th century.11 Ottoman
colonization in 1463 introduced Islam to a largely Christian society (Catholic and Orthodox), and
although there were tensions between groups, these tensions were largely religious rather than
ethnic. Although many converted to Islam, Christians enjoyed some self-governance under
Ottoman rule, which allowed the religious communities to coalesce politically, marking the
beginning of the transition from strictly religious groups to more complicated national groups.12
Today, these religious differences have evolved to help delineate ethnic groups: Bosniaks tend to
be Muslim, Serbs tend to be Orthodox, and Croats tend to be Catholic.13 After the AustroHungarian takeover in 1878, local bureaucrats deliberately exacerbated tensions between the
Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in attempts to gain power, while the Hapsburg sought to create a
Bosnian identity based on geography rather than ethnicity. The Hapsburg policies were not
popular, and resulted in a growth rather than decline in ethnonationalism. It is important to note
that the Muslims were still considered “anational” at this point, but they had enjoyed religious
privilege during Ottoman times, and began “coalescing communally” in an effort to protect that.
Nationalism among Bosnian Serbs, who wished to be made a part of independent Serbia,

11

Friedman, 6, 8.
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catalyzed the First World War when a Bosnian Serb nationalist, assassinated Archduke Franz
Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914. Croats (who fought with the Austrians in WWI) and Bosnian
Muslims began violent protests against the Serbs.14 Post-WWI, the multinational predecessor to
Yugoslavia, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, came into existence. 15 During this
period, Serbs dominated the centralized government, while Croats and Slovenes sought to
decentralize the government, and Muslims actively pursued the maintenance of political
autonomy. This conflict led to a ban on nationalist parties. The Kingdom was then renamed
Yugoslavia and divided into nine districts. Four of those districts split up what had historically
been Bosnia-Herzegovina, nullifying Muslim efforts to maintain autonomy and leaving them
minorities in all four districts, three of which had a Serb majority and one of which had a Croat
majority.16
After invasion and division by the Axis powers in 1941, the fascist Independent State of
Croatia began the deportation and extermination of Jews and Roma. The Serbs and Bosnian
Muslims fared better: a third of Serbs converted (voluntarily or forcibly) to Catholicism and
survived, while Bosnian Muslims were identified as “not ethnically unique” from Croats, and
Islam was made a state religion along with Catholicism. Multiethnic Partisan forces led by Josip
Tito liberated Yugoslavia from fascism and ended the inter-ethnic civil war, which mainly pitted
Serbs against fascist-supporting Muslims and Croats. Tito unified Yugoslavia through Marxism,
but despite the ethnic warfare that had shaped World War II in the Balkans, there was no truth
and reconciliation process in an effort to “negate the previous separate histories… to bind the
South Slavs together.”17 Five republics divided along historic ethnic borders were created, along
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with a sixth – Bosnia and Herzegovina – that was multiethnic, containing large numbers of
Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbs and Croats fought
each other for control, making the Muslims, who were still not considered a separate ethnic
group, a desirable ally in coalition-building.18 Tito worked to create a country focused on
domestic consensus, but the division into largely ethnically-based republics made his job harder.
Despite large ethnic minorities in almost all of the republics, the republics pursued issues
“through the filter of national self-interest, which inevitably fragmented Yugoslav society along
national lines… [and] undercut the basis for civil society.”19 This led to the wars for
independence, including the Bosnian War, following his death.

3. The ICTY
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia only deals with individual
perpetrators, as organizations and administrations are out of its jurisdiction, and four types of
crimes: “grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva conventions, violations of the laws or customs of
war, genocide and crimes against humanity.”20 It was intended to hold people accountable for
war crimes, not to improve relationships between former combatants,21 and considers itself to
“[have] contributed to an indisputable historical record.” (emphasis added).22 As the most
ethnically diverse of the former Yugoslav republics (43% Bosniaks, 33% Bosnian Serbs, and
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Friedman, 22-24.
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“Mandates and Crimes under ICTY Jurisdiction,” United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former
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James Meernik and Jose Raul Guerrero, “Can Criminal Justice Advance Ethnic Reconciliation? The ICTY and
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17% Bosnian Croats23), there is considerable internal division along ethnonationalist lines
regarding the ICTY’s narratives. This is amplified by the fact that some of the most devastating
breaches of humanitarian law, including the genocide at Srebrenica, happened during the
Bosnian War, which means that the ICTY’s cases dealing with Bosnia included some of its most
controversial cases.

3A. The ICTY’s Official Narrative
The ICTY’s investigation of crimes committed in Srebrenica in 1995 led to the
indictment of twenty individuals, with more than 1,000 witness testimonies. As of June 2015,
fourteen of those individuals had been convicted, one individual was acquitted, and one case was
terminated (as the accused died before a judgment was passed).24 In addition to witness
testimonies that included both victims and perpetrators, the ICTY also used mass grave
exhumations, testimony from demographic experts, and intercepted military communications.
The trials led to a few key findings: that Bosnian Serb forces (along with others) killed between
7,000 and 8,000 Bosniaks over the span of about one week, that these killings were mass
executions rather than battle casualties, that the executions were planned ahead of time, and that
the executions qualify as genocide.25
The ICTY’s rhetoric surrounding Srebrenica is particularly strong. In their publication
entitled “Facts About Srebrenica”, the ICTY states that “[the] massacre… was the single worst
atrocity committed in the former Yugoslavia during the wars of the 1990s and the worst
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“The Conflicts.”
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massacre that occurred in Europe since the months after World War II.” (emphasis added).26 The
ICTY also uses the phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt” ten times in the eight-page document.27
However, in a 2012 survey conducted in the Republika Srpska (RS, the Bosnian entity
dominated by Bosnian Serbs), where the majority of the population are ethnic Serbs, only 20.1%
of respondents had heard of the massacres at Srebrenica, believe that it happened, and believe it
to be a crime.28 In the “Facts About Srebrenica” document, the ICTY acknowledges some of the
major narratives of denial: that the number of people killed was exaggerated, that most of the
dead were combatants rather than civilians, that the attacks were spontaneous and came about as
revenge for attacks on ethnic Serbs living near Srebrenica, and that it simply was not genocide.29
The fact that the ICTY feels the need to address these narratives of denial, despite claiming that
their historical narrative is indisputable and that this case has been proven “beyond a reasonable
doubt”, indicates that these narratives of denial are widespread enough and have gained enough
traction that the ICTY’s ethos has been called into question. People seem to be making room for
denial in the ICTY’s findings, whether the ICTY believes that room is there or not. The question
now is why, and how?

3B. Attitudes towards the ICTY in Bosnia
Members of every ethnic group committed and suffered “horrendous crimes”, including
systematic rape, civilian detention centers, and genocide.30 Within Bosnia-Herzegovina,
however, Bosniaks and Croats tend to say that their respective ethnic groups were the greatest

26

“Facts About Srebrenica,” 1.
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victims, and both agree that the Serbs were the greatest perpetrators. In contrast, Bosnian Serbs
tend to say that everyone suffered equally and everyone bears equal responsibility as
perpetrators.31 In a survey from 2012, respondents from the RS had largely negative views of the
ICTY in general, with 84% of the RS respondents reporting a mainly negative or extremely
negative perception of the ICTY. In contrast, 59% of residents of the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, where the population is mainly Bosniak and Croat, report a mainly positive or
extremely positive view of the ICTY. However, in the Herzegovina region within the Federation,
which has the largest concentration of ethnic Croats in Bosnia, 85% of the population has a
mainly negative or extremely negative perception of the ICTY. This indicates that Bosniaks are
the only ethnic group with a generally positive perception of the ICTY.32 Among Serbs in the RS
and Croats in Croatia,33 the most prevalent rationale for not trusting the ICTY was that it is
perceived as biased against members of the ethnic group of the respondent.34 In contrast,
Bosniaks felt that the ICTY was unbiased and treated the three ethnic groups equally.35 Of the
ICTY cases completed by 2005, two-thirds of the defendants were Serbs, a quarter were Croats,
and less than a tenth were Bosniaks.36
It is estimated that 3.1% of the Bosniak population in Bosnia-Herzegovina was killed or
disappeared during the war, in contrast with 1.4% of the Bosnian Serb population and 1.0% of
the Bosnian Croat population. In terms of absolute numbers, 57,992 Bosniaks, 19,398 Bosnian
Serbs, and 7,543 Bosnian Croats were killed or disappeared. Bosniaks also made up over 60% of
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Milanović, 244.
Milanović, 240.
33
Because there are no separate results for Croats and Bosniaks in the Federation, I chose to use the results from
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deaths among civilian men and women, and military men and women, and accounted for 65.0%
of total deaths, while Bosnian Serbs accounted for 21.7% of total deaths and Bosnian Croats
accounted for 8.5% of total deaths.37 Based on these numbers, Bosniaks clearly suffered the most
losses, both in terms of percentage of the population killed or missing and in terms of percentage
of war deaths, indicating that Bosniaks’ perception of themselves as the greatest victims is in fact
correct, despite Croats’ and Serbs’ disagreement. This is not to say that Bosniaks did not also
commit brutal war crimes, because they did, but it is logical that the ICTY has indicted the least
Bosniaks out of the three ethnic groups.
From these statistics, we begin to understand why the ICTY’s narrative of Srebrenica has
been simultaneously rejected and accepted by different groups. Bosniaks felt that they were the
greatest victims of the war and that the Serbs were the greatest perpetrators. Their worldview
appears to align with the ICTY’s findings, as most of the indictees have been Serbs, with very
few Bosniaks. Because their worldview is generally in consonance with the ICTY, they tend to
have a more positive opinion of the ICTY, and are therefore more likely to accept its version of
what happened during the Bosnian War. However, it is important to note even though the ICTY
generally aligns with Bosniak worldviews, Bosniaks still force cases that do not align with that
worldview out of the common narrative. For example, when one Bosniak general who had been
convicted of responsibility for war crimes died, he was still granted a “state funeral… with full
military honors.”38 Bosnian Serbs felt that everyone was equally responsible and suffered
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Jan Zwierchowski and Ewa Tabeau, “The 1992-95 War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Census-Based Multiple
System Estimation of Casualties Undercount,” International Research Workshop on the Global Costs of Conflict
(2010), 15, 18.
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equally, which contradicts the ICTY, who has indicted the most Serbs out of any ethnic group,
causing them to feel persecuted by the ICTY and to not accept its narrative. Clearly, despite the
fact that the ICTY is intended to judge individuals, members of the ethnic groups who made up a
vast majority of the indictments feel as though their ethnic group as a whole is on trial, and if one
feels that members of one’s own in-group are being judged unfairly based on the aspect of their
identity that ties that person to the rest of the group, that person is unlikely to accept the narrative
created by those trials. These worldviews come into play in shaping the Bosniak and Bosnian
Serb narratives of Srebrenica.

3. Narratives of Affirmation
One of the most prominent ways that the ICTY’s official narrative is publicly affirmed is
through the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Center. The Center consists of a cemetery with a
musala for prayer, a museum, and a memorial room. The Memorial Center is located in
Srebrenica (within the Republika Srpska); the battery factory that was transformed into the
memorial room was one of the sites where the VRS initially separated Bosniak men from women
and children.39 The Memorial Center was officially opened on September 20, 2003, with the
burial of almost 1,000 victims of the genocide. The idea was brought forth by Paddy Ashdown,
then serving as the High Representative in Bosnia, after his visit to the Holocaust Exhibition at
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Sarah Wagner, “Tabulating Loss, Entombing Memory: The Srebrenica Potočari Memorial Centre,” in Memory
Mourning, Landscape, ed. Elizabeth Anderson, Avril Maddrell, Kate McLoughlin and Alana Vincent (Boston:
BRILL, 2010): 67.
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London’s Imperial War Museum.40 It is managed and owned by the Foundation of SrebrenicaPotočari Memorial and Cemetery, which is based in Sarajevo.41
The entrance to the cemetery takes you to a curved path that runs in between the
memorial wall and the musala, an structure with open walls that provides a place for prayer for
visiting Muslims. The floor is engraved with prayer spaces, and spare prayer mats sit to the
side.42 The cemetery, located on a slight hill, consists of rows and rows of 6,000 identical
gravestones, white pillars a few feet tall, inscribed with the interred’s name, birthday, hometown,
and a quote from the Koran: “And call not those who are slain in the way of Allah ‘dead.’ Nay,
they are living, only ye perceive not.”43 Most graves hold only portions of remains, rather than
entire bodies; the VRS used heavy machinery to dig up the mass graves at the execution sites and
redistribute the corpses among secondary mass graves, “[resulting] in the violent disarticulation
of human skeletal remains… an individual victim’s lower half might be found in one mass grave
and the upper half in [another]… site”, making it difficult to find entire bodies.44 The graves are
arranged in family plots, with gaps waiting to be filled by the remains of still unidentified
bodies.45 In front of the graves, at the bottom of the hill, sits the memorial wall, a semicircular
wall engraved with the names of the victims of the genocide, low enough that you can see the
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Olivera Simić, “Remembering, Visiting and Placing the Dead: Law, Authority and Genocide in Srebrenica,” Law
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graves, but angled in a way that you can read every name.46 At one end of the wall sits a threesided obelisk with the same prayer written in Arabic, Bosnian, and English.47
One of the ways in which the cemetery affirms the ICTY’s narrative is in its
demonstration of the scale of the atrocities, a part of the narrative that is often brought under
contention. Although there is space for the burial places to extend behind the main area where
musala and memorial wall are located, all of the graves are located in front of the middle of the
musala. This means that when you enter the cemetery, there are no graves behind you, blocked
from view. Instead, they extend back and to the sides, although there are significantly more on
the right of the entrance than on the left. This, along with the uniformity of the graves,
emphasizes not only the sheer number of people killed, but also creates a sense of solidarity,
linking the victims after death. The memorial wall that surrounds the area where you enter also
underlines the magnitude of the tragedy with the number of names displayed. As you walk the
path along the memorial wall, the graves are always in the background, a constant reminder that
these are the names of the dead. The prayer inscribed on the obelisk, the Koran verses on the
graves, and the musala all mark Islam as central to this place. Religion is one of the faultlines
along which the different ethnic groups in the Balkans divide themselves, and the act of defining
this as a Muslim place specifically further emphasizes the separation between the groups,
drawing a hard line between the victims and the perpetrators.
The cemetery builds off the minimalist style that rose to popularity in memorialization
following World War II, which Doss discusses in reference to memorials of fear. Memorials like
the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., the Oklahoma City National Memorial in
Oklahoma City, and the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin mark a “rejection of

46
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representational styles” in the face of many large-scale tragedies, as a result of the perceived
“inadequacy of traditional forms of representational art.”48 Doss believes that “when public
feelings matter, and public is deemed especially successful when it generates strong feelings of
social relevance and public ‘ownership,’ minimalist art is considered the ‘best’ aesthetic because
of its participatory and experiential dimensions.”49 The musala invites visitors to participate in
and experience memorialization by praying in the memory of the victims, and its simple design,
with open walls and a plain roof, echo minimalist design principles. The experiential aspect is
also present in the cemetery at Srebrenica in the Memorial Wall, which mimics memorials like
the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial by listing the names of the dead. This is participatory because it
invites the visitor to read the names and engage with the memory of the dead in that way. When I
visited the memorial, the wall was perhaps one of the most moving parts, because reading the
names felt like a form of recognizing the humanity of each victim. Because the names are sorted
by family, it drives home the fact that some families were essentially decimated by genocide. For
example, the Salihović family name takes up almost four whole columns on the wall, more than
200 names.50 The gravestones themselves are also minimalist in their style and in their
uniformity: rows and rows of simple white obelisks, all exactly the same except for the names.
The combination of the wall and the gravestones emphasize the massive loss of population, and
along with the prayer inscribed on the column next to the wall, make the social relevance
abundantly clear: the genocide must be remembered in order to prevent such a massive loss of
life from happening again, and that there is a fear that denial and apathy could lead to another
such event.

48
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The abandoned battery factory, the site where so many Bosniaks saw their family
members for the last time, is appropriately somber. Referred to as the Spomen soba, the
Memorial Room, it was the main instructional space for the memorial beginning in 2003 until
about two years ago, when the new museum space opened. The old factory is in a state of semidecay, and marked by its industrial past, with rust stains spotting the walls and floor, exposed
metal beams criss-crossing the ceiling, cracked paint, and some factory equipment still standing
in a corner. The Foundation have done little to change the layout of the space, with the exception
constructing two black structures that stand in the middle of the factory floor. One holds a series
of twenty narrow displays with the stories of twenty victims and their lives before the genocide,
containing the belongings that were found with them in the mass graves. The other provides a
viewing space for audio and video clips of the genocide. Informational displays line the
perimeter of the room, flat against the wall.51 Again, we see the minimalism that Doss discusses
in her section on memorials to fear. The black cubes themselves are extremely minimalist and
feature no ornamentation, and the industrial materials used in the construction of the factory, its
original purpose, align well with aspects of minimalist design, as bronze, marble, and other
traditional materials are not typically used in minimalism. Instead, minimalist sculptors tend to
gravitate more towards materials like concrete and metal,52 both conveniently already present in
the factory.
Here, the Memorial Center explicitly engages in conversation with the ICTY’s official
narrative. One of the displays, approximately three feet tall, pictured in Appendix 2, features
quotes from witness testimonies and from the ICTY’s description of the events, along with a
quote from the trial of Radislav Krstić in large print at the top: “Those who devise and

51
52

See Appendix 2.
Doss, 125.

Masur 17
implement genocide seek to deprive humanity of the manifold richness its nationalities, races,
ethnicities, and religions provide. This is a crime against all humankind, its harm being felt not
only by the group targeted for destruction, but by all of humanity.” It also contains a brief
synopsis of the ICTY’s founding and context for Srebrenica. This is a clear moment of
affirmation of the ICTY’s narrative of Srebrenica. By referencing the court cases and the witness
testimonies, the Memorial Rooms borrows some of the ICTY’s ethos as an international court of
justice to give its own narrative authority on the subject.
While the cemetery communicates the scale of the massacre, the Memorial Room seeks
to personalize it, to make visitors come face to face with the reality of the deep losses suffered by
the Bosniak community. In Martha Minow’s work on genocide and transitional justice, she
argues that genocide is not just about obliterating a group, but also obliterating the stories of
individuals within that group.53 The Memorial Room literally and figuratively sheds light on the
stories of victims, as the displays located inside the black structures are the only artificiallyilluminated portion within the black structure. On the walls of the factory, some of the displays
also include photographs of personal items used to identify victims. These displays, both the
signs and the alcoves spotlighting twenty of the victims, are similar to other memorials to the
dead, particularly in memorials to Holocaust victims at Auschwitz-Birkenau and the Jewish
Museum Vilnius. These types of displays tend to prioritize emotional connection between the
audience and the displays.54 The audience sees themselves in the everyday objects of the dead –
the key rings, the glasses, etc. – and empathizes with the victims.
As previously mentioned, ethnonationalism in Bosnia today is centered around
victimhood. The Memorial Center clearly positions the Bosniaks as victims, and rightfully so.
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The cemetery emphasizes the religious identity of the victims as a way of supporting the ICTY’s
narrative that this was a genocide, because religion serves as one of the differentiators between
ethnic groups in the Balkans. The uniformity of the thousands upon thousands of graves works in
conjunction with the Memorial Wall to emphasize the scale of the tragedy, and to pre-emptively
fight narratives of denial regarding the number of victims (which will be discussed in the next
section). In contrast, the Memorial Room seeks to personalize the tragedy to the audience, and
uses video and audio footage, as well as material from the ICTY itself, to build its authority, and
to convince visitors of the truthfulness of this narrative of genocide and persecution at the hands
of the Bosnian Serbs.

4. Narratives of Denial
These narratives of affirmation, however, are constantly battling narratives of denial,
particularly coming from Serbs in Bosnia and beyond. These narratives seek to repudiate or
challenge the official narrative of Srebrenica and the narratives of affirmation espoused primarily
by Bosniaks and by the international community. Israel Charny, a noted scholar of genocide,
identifies multiple forms of genocide denial: reframing it as a different crime, constructing the
perpetrator as the victim, placing it in the distant past, claiming that research as incomplete,
framing statistics as inaccurate, and claiming that victims were actually treated well.55 Four of
these six forms – reframing it as another crime, constructing the perpetrator as the victim,
claiming that research is incomplete, and framing the statistics as inaccurate – are present in the
narratives of denial that I will analyze. As previously mentioned, Bosnian Serbs tend to believe
that all three ethnic groups suffered equally during the Bosnian War, and that everyone bears
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equal responsibility as perpetrators.56 Thus, denial seems to center around minimizing the crimes
against Bosniaks and maximizing the crimes against Serbs, using the techniques that Charny
identifies.
One example of a public display of this narrative is the Memorial to Serb Civilians,
located at Kravica, approximately ten miles away from the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial
Center.57 The Memorial to Serb Citizens is a concrete cross stands over 20 feet tall, and was
erected in 2005, ten years after the genocide at Srebrenica.58 Part of the inscription on the cross
reads:
The monument marks
the combatants killed and civilian victims
who died defending their homeland
and the Serb victims of the Second World War
of the Birač and central Podrinje region
Republika Srpska
From 1992 to 1995
3,267 Serb victims
From 1941 to 1945
6,469 Serb victims59
While this memorial does not explicitly address the genocide at Srebrenica, there are ways in
which the memorial seeks to position Serbs as the real victims in the region, thereby shifting
victimhood to the perpetrator. The opening of memorial was planned for July 12, the day after
the annual Day of Remembrance for the victims of the genocide at Srebrenica, and the day on
which, ten years earlier, General Ratko Mladić declared Srebrenica liberated for the Serb
people.60 Not only does this memorial link the Bosnian Army and the Nazis together as outside
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threats to the Serb “homeland”, it also contains an outright lie in terms of the number of victims
it claims to support the narrative that the Serbs were the greatest victims. According to the
Research and Documentation Center, an NGO based in Sarajevo, only 849 Serb civilians died in
the Podrinje region during the war,61 about 10-12% of the estimated number of Bosniaks killed
in the genocide.
Denial has also run rampant among Bosnian Serb politicians at multiple levels of
government, as well as among everyday citizens. Mladen Grujičić, the first Serb mayor of
Srebrenica, elected in October 2016, declared that he “can’t agree with the qualification of the
crime [as genocide],” claiming that the number of victims is exaggerated. While he has not taken
anything out of the town’s budget for the annual Day of Remembrance, he has increased the
section in the budget for commemorating Serb victims of the war.62 This not only reframes the
genocide as another crime, but also calls the statistics into questions and implicitly reframes the
perpetrators as victims, therefore engaging in three of Charny’s forms of genocide denial.
Milorad Dodik led the charge in 2018 to annul a report produced by the RS that
acknowledged the scale of the crimes at Srebrenica in July of 1995 and that those crimes were a
serious violation of international humanitarian law. Dodik, at the time the president of the RS,
now the Serb member of the tripartite Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, claims that the
report propagated “false data… with the intention of satanising Serbs.” Neither Bosniak nor
Croat members of the RS’s legislature supported the decision to reject the old report and sponsor
a new report on war crimes committed at Srebrenica between 1992 and 1995 that would
“illuminate all the uncertainties from the first report, but also include in the report the suffering
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of Serbs in and around Srebrenica,” in the words of the Assembly.63 The most salient of
Charny’s forms of genocide denial in this action is attacking the research as incomplete, as it
specifically calls the legitimacy of the first report into question. Dodik specifically refers to
“false data”, most likely implying that the number of deaths was exaggerated, another form of
genocide denial. He also seeks to reframe the victim as perpetrator, both in terms of the violence
and crimes that occurred at the time, and in terms of the way the issue has been treated since
1995. Dodik also supported a 2017 ban on textbooks from the Federation that include sections
about the siege of Sarajevo or the massacre at Srebrenica, saying “it is impossible to use
schoolbooks … in which it is written that the Serbs committed genocide and held Sarajevo under
siege. It’s not true and it will not be studied [in the RS],”64 not quite reframing the genocide as a
different crime, but denying that it was a genocide.
Milos Milovanović heads the Kravica war veterans’ association and is a prominent local
member of the Serbian Democratic Party, the party to which Radovan Karadžić (president of the
RS during the Bosnian War and convicted war criminal for his involvement in Srebrenica,
among other crimes) belongs. In 2005, he told reporters that "The massacre is a lie," and that "It
is propaganda, created to portray the Serbian people in a bad light. The Muslims are lying and
are manipulating the numbers and exaggerating what happened.”65 This fiery rhetoric takes
reframing the genocide as another crime to the extreme, as it even contests the event’s status as a
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massacre, which is less serious than a genocide. It also constructs the perpetrators as victims, not
of the violence itself, but of the narrative surrounding the violence, and contests the current
research by claiming that the statistics have been falsified.
Similar narratives of denial are present among everyday citizens as well. According to
one Bosnian Serb citizen in Bibici, a village near Srebrenica, "[The Bosniaks] got what they
asked for in 1995… Ninety-nine per cent of the Serbs will tell you the same."66 This sentiment is
echoed by graffiti that Lara Nettelfield and Sarah Wagner encountered in Milići, a small town
near Srebrenica, while researching their book, Srebrenica in the Aftermath of Genocide, which
reads “For Kravica, you got Srebrenica. We played by your rules.”67 While these are two isolated
examples, they demonstrate that these narratives of denial are a larger trend because they
associate these narratives with a larger community. The first does this by claiming that 99% of
Serbs would agree with this statement which, although most likely an exaggeration, indicates
that this narrative is widespread throughout the Bosnian Serb community. The second does so by
referring presumably to the Serbs as “we” and to the Bosniaks as “you”, drawing a line between
the two groups and constructing the violence on either side as collective. This reframes the
genocide as a different crime – an act of justified revenge.
While the design of the Memorial to Serb Citizens has aspects that link it to memorials
designed to conjure fear – a simple design made from concrete, an industrial material, and places
to lay flowers, which makes it participatory – the majority of the overall memorialization on the
Bosnian Serb side centers around anger: anger that at perceived persecution by the ICTY, anger
66
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that the Bosniaks are seen as the victims and they as the perpetrators. Doss describes memorials
designed to promote anger as a combination of, among other things, “fear, … lack of trust, …
and a sense of slight.”68 As previously discussed, Bosnian Serbs do not tend to have faith in the
ICTY as they tend to feel that Serbs are unfairly blamed for crimes committed during the war,
which brings in aspects of fear of persecution by the ICTY and a lack of trust in the official
narrative because it was set forth by the ICTY. Milovanović mentions “[wanting] to have a place
where we can pray for the souls of our victims… like the memorial in Potočari,” as one of the
motivations behind the Memorial to Serb Citizens,69 which indicates a sense that Serb victims
are being slighted and ignored in the region in favor of the Bosniak victims.
These narratives of denial serve an ethnonationalist agenda by decentering Bosnian Serbs
as perpetrators and Bosniaks as victims. By calling the research and statistics into question, and
reframing the genocide as a different crime, these narratives of denial seek to cast doubt on the
Bosniaks’ victimhood, and characterize them as liars. In doing so, the Bosnian Serbs also cast
themselves as the innocent victims of the violence itself and of history, wrongfully accused of
war crimes that they did not commit, with the loss of life in their community ignored. In this
version of history, the Bosnian Serbs are the persecuted, not persecutors, and the Bosniaks are
the villains. Dodik’s success as a politician – rising from Prime Minister of the entity of the RS
to president of the same entity to president of the country – serves as a prime example that these
ethnonationalist narratives centered around claiming victimhood and denying perpetrator status
pay off on a larger scale. The fact that these narratives are echoed by lower-level politicians and
everyday citizens highlight the pervasiveness of these narratives that work in a mutuallyreinforcing cycle: politicians like Dodik get elected at least partially based on their rhetoric, their
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election increases their platform and credibility, they aggressively deny the official narrative,
thereby reinforcing their constituents’ views, and the constituents continue to vote for politicians
expressing the same rhetoric.

5. Conclusion
In conclusion, the ICTY’s official narrative of what happened at Srebrenica is
simultaneously challenged and affirmed in Bosnia. Bosniaks, the victims of the genocide, tend to
believe that they suffered the most during the Bosnian War, and that Serbs were the greatest
perpetrators of violence. Because this typically matches with ICTY narratives, Bosniaks have a
generally positive view of the ICTY (although they are not immune from the trend of denying
ICTY findings that contradict their worldview). In contrast, Serbs tend to believe that each ethnic
group was equally a victim and a perpetrator, which does not usually align with the ICTY’s
narrative. The ICTY found that that Bosnian Serb forces (along with others) killed between
7,000 and 8,000 Bosniaks over the span of about one week, that these killings were mass
executions rather than battle casualties, that the executions were planned ahead of time, and that
the executions qualify as genocide. In response, Bosniaks have engaged in historical memory
practices that affirm the ICTY’s narrative, as exemplified by the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial
Center. This memorialization centers around fear of the genocide being forgotten and potentially
repeated. In contrast, Bosnian Serbs have embarked on their own mission to repudiate this
narrative by erecting their own memorials to Serb victims, publicly denying the ICTY’s findings,
and funding alternative narratives. While fear plays a role in memorialization and underscores
some of the feelings of anger present, anger is the main driving force in the Bosnian Serb
memorialization of Srebrenica.
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This is significant because it is genocide denial in the name of ethnonationalism,
falsifying and manipulating historical narratives to support a narrow, uncritical view of history. It
is important to recognize that both the narratives of affirmation and narratives of denial are used
as tools to further political goals, and to think critically about how either narrative fits into an
agenda. However, as historians, we must not confuse neutrality for objectivity. Not taking a side
is entirely different than taking an informed position based on a fair evaluation of facts. We can
recognize that many Serbs were killed in Srebrenica and that Bosniaks also committed war
crimes elsewhere without trying to equate these crimes. These deaths and crimes were tragic,
yes, but cannot compare to the scale and tragedy of a genocide, the worst massacre in Europe
since the Holocaust. This evaluation is not intended to cast one group as the victims and the other
as the perpetrators. A similar paper about denialism and conflicting narratives could probably be
written about any of the ICTY’s rulings, and each one would paint a different picture of the
degree to which each ethnic group was victim or perpetrator. It is important to recognize that the
same group can be both in different contexts, and being able to think critically about the history
of one’s own group is a valuable skill in a context in which it appears that many still think about
that history in terms of black and white.
Even in the face of such competing narratives, there is still hope for reconciliation. In
June 2005, during Slobodan Milošević’s (the president of Serbia during the war) trial, a video of
a Serbian paramilitary unit was introduced into evidence:
The video starts with a Serbian Orthodox priest blessing the unit members before they go
off on their mission. Then, young [Bosniak] men, probably in their teens, showing
evidence of severe beatings, are unloaded from a truck and made to lie on the ground,
their hands tided [sic] behind their back. After a while, the men are made to walk up a
hill, where they are shot in the back, point blank, from automatic weapons. The last two
are made to carry the others to a pit, before being executed themselves. All of this is
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happening to a background of banter and insults while the cameraman complains about
the battery being almost empty, but urges his colleagues to ‘continue working’.70
The same day that the video was entered into evidence, excerpts of the footage ranging from
eight minutes to 20 seconds aired on a number of television channels in Serbia, including the
public broadcaster. While the video was originally intended to prove that Serbia actively
participated in the Bosnian War, it had an added impact of “destroying, in the eyes of many, the
myths of the heroic Serbian warriors fighting with honor in Bosnia,”71 and sparking a wave of
affirmation of the ICTY’s narrative. The President and Prime Minister of Serbia both publicly
condemned the crimes at Srebrenica, as did every active Serbian political party and the Serbian
Orthodox Church. The President also announced his intention to honor the victims on the tenth
anniversary of the massacre, and Parliament introduced a resolution to condemn the crimes at
Srebrenica. The version of the resolution that passed, however, condemned all crimes committed
during the Bosnian War (so that those committed against Serbs were included).72 While this still
did not totally affirm the ICTY’s narrative (the word “genocide” was still not used) and this
happened in Serbia, not Bosnia, it still represents the hope of finding some common ground and
coming to terms with the past through education.
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Appendix 1: The Cemetery.

Personal image, July 14, 2017.

Personal image, July 14, 2017.
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Personal image, July 14, 2017. The musala is visible in the background.

Image courtesy of Nicholas Kulawiak, July 2016. The memorial wall and central area are visible,
as are the gaps in the grid of gravestones.
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Image courtesy of Nicholas Kulawiak, July 2016.
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Appendix 2: The Memorial Room

The interior of the Memorial Room, personal image, July 14, 2017.
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Images of personal items that were used to help identify bodies of the victims, personal image,
July 14, 2017.
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Appendix 3: Memorial to Serb Citizens

Image: Marie Louise Sorensen, Memorial Complex at Kravica, 2010, digital image, Cambridge
University. http://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/225999

